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FM ALGIERS

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HAKTO 8 IMMEDIATE

FM: THE SECRETARY

TH: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PM
MEIR THROUGH SHALEV. IN VIEW DE PENDING ISRAELI CABINET
MEETING AND INCREASINGLY NASTY MOOD IN ISRAEL, IT IS
ESSENTIAL REPEAT ESSENTIAL TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
THIS MORNING. INFORM ME AS SOON AS IT HAS BEEN DELIVERED.
ALSO, HAVE YOU DELIVERED MY MESSAGE TO MEIR?

BEGIN TEXT!

DEAR MADAME PRIME MINISTER!

I AM WRITING TO YOU REGARDING SECRETARY KISSINGER'S MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND ON THE EVE OF MIS ARRIVAL IN ISRAEL. I RECEIVED YESTER AY A FULL REPORT OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. GROMYKO IN WHICH. AS HE HAS REPORTED TO YOU. HE SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED SOVIET PROPOSALS WHICH IN OUR JUDGMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN ENORMOUSLY COMPLICATING AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE COMMON EFFORTS OF ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY SEPARATION OF FORCES IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.

MORI/CDF C03344667

IN MY TALKS WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER BEFORE HE LEFT, WE DISCUSSED AND REFLECTED ON THE IMMEDIATE DAYS AHEAD, THEIR CRUCIAL CHARACTERS AND THEIR DECISIVE IMPACT ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. SIMPLY STATED, MADAME PRIME MINISTER. IF A SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED, IT COULD BUILD FURTHER ON THE FOUNDATION OF CONFIDENCE WHICH HAS BEGUN TO DEVELOP AS A PESULT OF THE SCRIPULOUS IMPLEMENTATION BY EGYPT AND ISRAEL OF THE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT. IT COULD ALSO OPEN NEW AVENUES FOR ADDITIONAL STEPS TOWARDS

State Dept. review completed

PEACE AND A FURTHER STRENGTHENING IN ISRAEL'S SECURITY.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IF WE FAIL IN THIS ENDEAVOR, I AM
CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL WILL FACE A SITUATION FRAUGHT WITH
RISKS. IT WOULD MEAN THE REVERSAL OF THE TREND TOWARDS
REDUCED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE AREA, THE INJECTION OF THE
VIEWS OF OTHER WHO NEITHER APPRECIATE NOR SEEM INTERESTED

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

SCOWCROFT, MCFARLANE, RODMAN, SECFL

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\*\*\*\*\*\* \*\* S.E.C.R.E.T. \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* CDpv

\*WHSR COMMENT \*

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\*\*\*\*\* S E C R E T

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IN HELPING TO MAINTAIN ISRAEL'S SECURITY. A SITUATION IN WHICH THE CAPACITY OF THE UNITED STATES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE FURPOSES WILL HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVELY NEUTRALIZED. AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANOTHER WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY AMERICAN ACTIONS WOULD BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN IN OCTOBER.

MADAME PRIME MINISTER, YOU HAVE OFTEN SAID, AND I HAVE APPRECIATED IT, THAT MY ADMINISTRATION MAS GIVEN MORE SUPPORT TO ISRAEL -- MATERIAL AND ROLLITICAL -- THAN PERHAPS ANY OTHER ADMINISTRATION. THIS IS NOT SAID, I KNOW, IN ANY PARTISAN WAY, BUT I BELIEVE THIS JUDGMENT TO BE ACCURATE. WE HAVE PURSUED A POLICY OF PROTECTING AND STRENGTHENING ISRAEL'S SECURITY BOTH WITH MATERIAL SUPPORT. AND DIPLOMATIC EFERRTS.

I THEREFORE FIND IT PROPOUNDLY DISTURBING TO SEE REPORTS FROM ISBAEL WHICH ARE CASTING DOUBT ON THE U.S. ROLE AND DESCRIBE DUR POLICY AS ONE WHICH IS PURSUING DETENTE WITHOUT FULL REGARD AND UNDERSTANDING OF ISRAEL'S INTERESTS. I CANNOT OVEREMPHASIZE WHAT A FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE FOR ISRAEL TO APPROACH THE CRITICAL DAYS AHEAD AND SECRETARY KISSINGER'S MISSION IN THIS FRAME OF MIND.

ISRAEL IS GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF READJUSTMENT. YOU HAVE SUFFERED PAIN AND ANGUISH FROM A RECENT WAR WHICH WAS NEITHER YOUR DESTRE NOR YOUR CHOOSING. BUT I FIND IT PAINFUL , MAGAM PRIME MINISTER, TO SEE DEVELOPING INSTSRAFE AN ATTITUDE OF GLOOM AND DISTRUST REGARDING THE U.S. EFFORTS. A VOTE ON A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. WHICH IN OUR JUDGMENT WAS NOT AS BALANCED AS WE WOULD HAVE LIKED BUT WAS MORE BALANCED THAN ANY IN THE PAST CANNOT ERA'SE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE TIMELY AIRLIFT IN ISRAEL'S HOUR OF PERIL, NOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN DISENGACEMENT AGREEMENT WHICH YOU YOURSELF CHARACTERIZED AS A VERY FAVORABLE RESULT FOR ISRAEL. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO UNDERSTAND HOW SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE COULD DEVELOP IN THE WEEK IN WHICH I AUTHORIZED A GENEROUS APPORTIONMENT OF THE \*\* 2.2 BILLION COMMITMENTS AND SENT TO THE CONGRESS A FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR 1975 WHICH PROVIDES EDUALLY GENERAUSLY FOR YOUR FUTURE NEEDS. LT IS PERPLEXING TO ME THAT OUR STEADFAST SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL COULD BE SERIOUSLY DOUBTED AT THIS CRITICAL HOUR AS SECRETARY KISSINGER IS ARRIVING IN YOUR COUNTRY ON HIS VITAL MISSION.

I KNOW AND UNDERSTAND YOUR WORRIES AND FEARS.
DIFFICULT DECISIONS LIE AHFAD, BUT THE RISKS OF FAILURE ARE SO GREAT AND THE CONSEQUENCES ARE SO FROFOUND THAT I FELT IT INCUMBENT UPON ME TO SHARE WITH YOU MY CONCERNS AND HOPES REGARDING THE COMING WEEKS. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION TO ASK OF YOU AND YOUR

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GOVERNMENT CONCESSIONS THAT WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE SURVIVIAL OF ISRAEL.

I HOPE THEREFORE, MADAM PRIME MINISTER, THAT YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT APPROACH THE TALKS WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER IN A MOOD OF DEPORTUNITY AS ISRAEL FACES ONE OF THE MOST FATEFUL WEEKS IN ITS HISTORY.

WARMEST REGARDS

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SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE

hakto 8

**IMMEDIATE** 

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: THE SECRETARY

Please convey following Presidential message to PM

Meir through Shalev. In view of pending Israeli Cabinet

meeting and increasingly nasty mood in Israel, it is

essential to deliver the message as soon as possible

this morning. Inform me as soon as it has been delivered.

Also, have you delivered my message to Meir?

BEGIN TEXT:

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

I am writing to you regarding Secretary Kissinger's mission to the Middle East and on the eve of his arrival in Israel. I received yesterday a full report of his conversations with Mr. Gromyko in which, as he has reported to you, he successfully resisted Soviet proposals which in our judgment would have been enormously complicating and prejudicial to the common efforts of Israel and the United States to achieve a satisfactory separation of forces in the Golan Heights.

SECRET/NODIS/SENSITIVE

**x2x** -la-

In my talks with Secretary Kissinger before he left, we discussed and reflected on the immediate days ahead, their crucial character, and their decisive impact on future developments. Simply stated, Madame Prime Minister, if a Syrian-Israeli disengagement can be achieved, it could build further on the foundation of confidence which has begun to develop as a result of the scrupulous implementation by Egypt and Israel of the disengagement agreement. It could also open new avenues for additional steps towards peace and a further strengthening of Israel's

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security.

On the other hand, if we fail in this endeavor, I am convinced that Israel will face a situation fraught with risks. It would mean the reversal of the trend towards reduced Soviet influence in the area, the injection of the views of others who neither appreciate nor seem interested in helping to maintain Israel's security, a situation in which the capacity of the United States for constructive purposes willhave been effectively neutralized, and the likelihood of another war in the Middle East under conditions in which both domestically and internationally American actions would be much more difficult than in October.

Madame Prime Minister, you have often said, and I have appreciated it, that my administration has given more support to Israel -- material and political -- than perhaps any other administration. This is not said, I know, in any partisan way, but I believe this judgment to be accurate. We have pursued a policy of protecting and strengthening Israel's security both with material support and diplomatic efforts.

I therefore find it profoundly disturbing to see reports from Israel which are casting doubt on the U.S. role and describe our policy as one which is pursuing detente without full regard and understanding of Israel's interests. I

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cannot overemphasize what a fundamental mistake I
believe it would be for Israel to approach the critical
days ahead and Secretary Kissinger's mission in

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this frame of mind.

Israel is going through a period of readjustment. You have suffered pain and anguish from a recent war which was neither your desire nor your choosing. But I find it painful, Madam Prime Minister, to see developing in Israel an attitude of gloom and distrust regarding the U.S. efforts. A vote on a Security Council resolution, which in our judgment was not as balanced as we would have liked but was more balanced than any in the past, cannot erase the magnitude of the timely airlift in Israel's hour of peril, nor the achievement of an Egyptian-Syrian disengagement agreement which you yourself characterized as a very favorable result for Israel. It is difficult for me to understand how such an atmosphere could develop in the week in which I authorized a generous apportionment of the \$2.2 billion commitment, and sent to the Congress a foreign assistance program for 1975 which provides equally generously for your future needs. It is perplexing to me that our steadfast support for Israel could be seriously doubted at this critical hour as Secretary Kissinger is arriving in your country on his vital mission.

I know and understand your worries and fears.

Difficult decisions lie ahead, but the risks of failure are so great and the consequences are so profound that

I felt it incumbent upon me to share with you my concerns

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and hopes regarding the coming weeks. I can assure you that it is not our intention to ask of you and your government concessions that would be prejudicial to the survival of Israel.

I hope therefore, Madam Prime Minister, that you and your government approach the talks with Secretary Kissinger in a mood of opportunity as Israel faces one of the most fateful weeks in its history.

Warmest regards,

Richard Nixon

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